Does Stockholding Provide Perfect Risk Sharing? by M. Fatih Guvenen
UNIVERSITY OF
ROCHESTER
Does Stockholding Provide Perfect Risk Sharing?
M. Fatih Guvenen
Working Paper No. 490
May 2002Does Stockholding Provide Perfect Risk Sharing?∗
Fatih Guvenen†
February 20, 2003
Abstract
This paper analyzes the extent of risk-sharing among stockholders. Wealthy house-
holds play a crucial role in many economic problems due to the substantial concentration
of wealth and asset holdings in the U.S. data. Hence, to evaluate the empirical impor-
tance of market incompleteness, it is essential to determine if idiosyncratic shocks are
important for the wealthy who also have better insurance opportunities compared to
the average household. We study a dynamic structural model where each period house-
holds compare the beneﬁts of stockholding with a per-period trading cost and decide
whether to participate in the stock market. Due to the endogenous entry decision, the
testable implications of perfect risk-sharing take the form of a sample selection model.
To eliminate the selection bias, we implement a semiparametric estimation method
recently proposed by Kyriazidou (2001). Using data from PSID we strongly reject per-
fect risk-sharing for stockholders, but perhaps surprisingly, ﬁnd no evidence against it
among non-stockholders. The results are robust to a number of changes in the test
method, such as including future wages into the instrument set, and testing from long
time diﬀerences. We oﬀer some explanations based on private information problems
and the resulting idiosyncratic production risk borne by wealthy households. Finally,
we strongly reject risk-sharing for the whole population consistent with existing liter-
ature. These ﬁndings indicate that, if anything, market incompleteness may be more
important for the wealthy, and suggest further focus on risk factors that primarily aﬀect
this group, such as business risks.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last few years models with incomplete markets and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks have
achieved a central place in many ﬁelds of economics. These models are used to study a wide range
of economic problems, such as wealth inequality, asset prices, business cycle dynamics, ﬁscal policy
and so on. For example, in Aiyagari (1994)-style models wealth inequality results from the desire of
households to accumulate a buﬀer stock wealth to self-insure against adverse shocks in the absence
of complete markets (Krusell and Smith (1998); and Castaneda, et. al. (2002)). Similarly, there is
a growing sense that uninsurable income shocks play an important role in determining asset prices
by making households more reluctant to take ﬁnancial risk, causing them to demand higher returns
(among others, Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996); Heaton and Lucas (1996); Storesletten, et. al
(2001), Brav, et. al. (2002)).
A major motivation for this literature has been the decisive empirical rejection of perfect risk-
sharing–the hypothesis that individuals can insure against all idiosyncratic shocks and are thus able
to equate the growth rate of their marginal utilities to one another. A number of empirical studies
have found households’ consumption growth (or more precisely their marginal utility growth) to
be correlated with certain idiosyncratic shocks–and income shocks in particular–violating the
premise of perfect insurance (Cochrane (1991); Nelson (1994); Townsend (1994); Attanasio and
Davis (1996); and Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ (1996)). If, on the other hand, perfect risk-sharing
(PRS) could be attained, idiosyncratic risk would be vanquished and play no role.
An important point to note is that these studies test if PRS holds for the whole population.
However, given that asset holdings and wealth are extremely concentrated–basically 90 percent of
non-housing wealth and 95 percent of equity is held by the top 20 percent of the U.S. population–
wealthy households play a crucial role in many economic interactions. Thus, for a satisfactory
analysis of many of the issues mentioned above, it is essential to determine the extent of risk-sharing
among wealthy households. For example, the main source of idiosyncratic uncertainty in most
heterogenous-agent models is labor income risk which is estimated to be substantial by empirical
studies on labor earnings.1 Nevertheless, if the wealthy are able to diversify this risk eﬀectively,
modeling these shocks as “uninsurable” may overstate the amount of risk in the economy.
On the one hand, there are good reasons to suspect that wealthy households may stand a better
chance of achieving perfect risk-sharing compared to the rest of the population. After all, the top
20 percent of the population almost exclusively trade in stock markets, which is arguably the most
sophisticated market-based risk sharing mechanism. Moreover, with ample assets that can be used
as collateral, borrowing constraints are less likely to be an obstacle to optimal portfolio formation.
Finally, empirical evidence indicates that high-skilled individuals face lower unemployment risk as
1See, among others, Moﬃt and Gottschalk (1995), Meghir and Pistaferri (2001), Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
and Storesletten, et. al (2002).
2well as smaller labor income shocks conditional on being employed (c.f. Kydland (1984); Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) and the references therein). Putting these pieces together, it seems possible that
the empirical rejection of PRS for the whole population may be driven by lack of insurance among
the poor and may not provide a justiﬁcation that idiosyncratic shocks are important for the small
minority of wealthy.
On the other hand, wealthy households are exposed to production risk to a much larger degree
compared to the rest of the population. For example, private capital–which is roughly as large
as the capital in publicly traded companies, and is potentially diﬃcult to insure due to private
information problems–is concentrated among the wealthy, exposing them to entrepreneurial income
risk not faced by other households.2 These diﬀerences in the kinds of risks faced and in the access to
ﬁnancial markets suggest that the severity of market incompleteness may be quite diﬀerent for each
group. Thus, in this paper we formally investigate the extent of risk-sharing among the wealthy
(stockholders) and among the rest of the population (non-stockholders).
A second motivation for studying the risk insurance role of ﬁnancial markets is normative. In all
modern economies enormous amounts of public funds are dedicated to providing social insurance in
the form of unemployment insurance, welfare programs, and so on. However, the canonical model
of portfolio decision–going all the way back to Arrow (1964)–attributes a central role to ﬁnancial
assets in the optimal sharing of risk: if all households have access to a complete set of securities the
resulting allocations will be Pareto optimal leaving no role for government intervention. Therefore it
is compelling to ask if, empirically, ﬁnancial markets are able to provide risk insurance eﬀectively, in
which case government policy could better serve by encouraging participation in these markets. This
can be accomplished, for example, by favorable tax treatment of investment income (eliminating
dividend taxation?), or by raising public awareness as was done by the British government in the
1980s, which resulted in stock market participation rates almost tripling in just a few years.
The interpretation of the risk-sharing tests faces a diﬃculty common to all classical hypothesis
testing: with a suﬃciently large sample size all empirical hypothesis will be rejected. At the same
time, lack of rejection with a ﬁxed sample size or a given instrument set may indicate the low power
of the test. Thus, a potentially more useful way to approach this question is to view perfect insurance
as an ideal benchmark and to assess the extent of risk-sharing among stockholders compared to the
rest of the population by their distance from this benchmark. That is, with a given sample size
and instrument set, if one rejects risk-sharing for one group but not for the other, this diﬀerence
can be interpreted as diﬀerences in the extent of insurance among each group. Hence, we ask if
the wealthy (stockholders) are able to share risk more eﬀectively than the rest (non-stockholders),
where the latter serves as a control group.
2Gentry and Hubbard (1998), Heaton and Lucas (2000), and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001) document
the extreme concentration of private capital and the business risks faced by entrepreneurs.
3We employ a ﬂexible preference speciﬁcation which allows for non-separabilities between con-
sumption and the leisure times of head and spouse, and incorporates household-speciﬁc preference
shifters. Moreover, ignoring preference heterogeneity can lead to false rejections of the PRS hy-
pothesis (Ogaki and Zhang (2001)), so we allow stockholders and non-stockholders to have diﬀerent
risk aversion and leisure elasticity parameters.
We consider an economy with a full set of ﬁnancial securities which are traded in the stock
market. Thus all shocks are potentially insurable. Each period households decide whether to
participate in the stock market by paying a one-time entry cost and a per-period participation cost,
or to stay out and invest in a single risk-free asset. These ﬁxed costs are intended to capture the
disutility associated with learning how to invest, and once in the market, the time spent monitoring
one’s portfolio. Households also make optimal portfolio and labor supply decisions.
Due to the endogenous stock market entry decision, the testable implications of the risk-sharing
hypothesis for stockholders take the form of a dynamic sample selection model (Tobit Type II, in
the terminology of Amemiya (1985)) where the participation decision rule serves as the selection
equation. To eliminate the selection bias, we implement a semiparametric GMM estimator recently
proposed by Kyriazidou (2001) for panel data models, which does not require strong distributional
assumptions about the error terms. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst implementation of this
estimator.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) on U.S. households we strongly reject perfect risk-sharing among stockholders, but
perhaps surprisingly, we ﬁnd no evidence against it among non-stockholders with consistently high
p-values across experiments. This result is robust to a number of changes, such as including future
values of wages into the instrument set (as advocated by Hayashi et. al (1996)), using long time
diﬀerences of the moment conditions (as suggested by Attanasio and Davis (1996)), using the impli-
cations of PRS for the marginal utility of leisure, and so on. Finally, we strongly reject risk sharing
for the whole population consistent with existing literature, suggesting that the rejections reported
in earlier studies are likely to be due to the failure of insurance not among the poor, but instead,
among the wealthy. Therefore, if anything, incomplete markets and idiosyncratic shocks are more
important for wealthy households. This ﬁnding in turn underscores the importance of focusing
on risks primarily faced by the wealthy such as entrepreneurial income risk, which are recently
being incorporated into incomplete markets models (c.f., Cagetti and Denardi (2001); Angeletos
and Calvet (2002); Chari et. al. (2002); and Smith and Wang (2002)).
These results are consistent with a number of recent ﬁndings in the literature. For example,
Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002) show that even after accounting for limited stock market
participation, market incompleteness among stockholders play a critical role in explaining the equity
premium puzzle. Second, Attanasio and Davis (1996)–while rejecting perfect insurance for the
4entire population–also ﬁnd that it fails most signiﬁcantly for the highest educated individuals
whereas there is much weaker evidence against it among lower educated groups (p. 1247, ﬁg3 ) .
Since education and wealth are positively correlated (Table 1) their ﬁnding suggests the same
pattern of risk sharing in the population as the one uncovered here (more on this in Section 7.1).
In fact, imperfect risk-sharing among the wealthy can be viewed as the (constrained) eﬃcient
outcome in an environment with private information and long-term contracts. Private information
naturally arises in entrepreneurial activities (largely undertaken by the wealthy), or may result from
the interaction between managers and ﬁrm owners. As is well-known, with private information the
social planner will implement incomplete risk-sharing to induce proper incentives (Rogerson (1985),
Ligon (1998), among others). We discuss this point further in Section 8.
Finally, by allowing for heterogeneity in preferences, we can address another interesting question.
Starting with Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) researchers have documented various diﬀerences between
the choices of stockholders and non-stockholders, such as their consumption processes, wealth levels,
etc. A natural question is whether these diﬀerences mainly reﬂect diﬀerent investment opportunity
sets faced by these groups, or whether they also reveal more fundamental heterogeneity in prefer-
ences. In our framework, we incorporate the diﬀerences in budget sets, and still ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the curvature of consumption and the labor supply elasticities of the
two groups.
In terms of method and approach this paper is most closely related to a number of studies which
test for perfect insurance among smaller groups in the population. The discouraging rejection
of PRS in the whole population (Cochrane (1991); Nelson (1994); Attanasio and Davis (1996);
Hayashi et. al (1996)), led researchers to focus on smaller units who have strong ties with the hope
of uncovering full insurance within these groups. Examples include households living in the same
geographical regions (Hess and Shin, 2000), inhabitants of small villages in various underdeveloped
countries (Townsend (1994); Udry (1994); Ligon (1998); and Ogaki and Zhang (2001)), and ﬁnally,
family members (Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ (1996)).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the model. We specify the
parameterization for the empirical work in Section 3. In Section 4 we develop the econometric
techniques to analyze this problem in the presence of selection bias. Then in Section 5 we describe
the data, and in Section 6 we discuss the estimation of the selection equation and the construction
of kernel weights. Section 7 explains how we carry out the estimation and presents the results for
the tests of risk-sharing with various instrument sets. We then discuss some explanations for the
ﬁndings, and conclude in Section 8.
52 The Model
We consider an economy which runs for T<∞ periods. There are a ﬁnite number of households,
each with a life span of τ <Tperiods, and each is composed of at least a head (henceforth called
husband) and a spouse. The uncertainty structure in this economy is treated as a probability
space (Ω,z,P) where each element in Ω denotes a particular realization of all random variables
in the economy for all dates. The information available to households can be represented as a
sequence of increasing σ− algebras (information ﬁltration) (z1 ⊆ z2 ⊆ ... ⊆ zT)a n dEt denotes
the mathematical expectation conditional on zt.
Households derive utility from consumption as well as from husband’s and spouse’s leisure
times. To capture heterogeneity in the population, we assume that each household’s utility is also
inﬂuenced by household-speciﬁc preference shifters, summarized in the vector Znt. Speciﬁcally, the
intertemporal preferences of household n is given by
E0
"
τ X
t=0
βtu(Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)
#
, (1)
where Cnt denotes consumption in period t; L1nt and L2nt are the leisure times of head and spouse
respectively. The period utility function, u, is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave in the choice
variables for each value of Znt.
Financial Markets and Participation
Let st denote a date-event pair (state), which constitutes a complete description of uncertainty
for all the economy that is realized in t, and let St =( s1,s 2,...,s t) be the history of all states
realized up through period t. For example, st will contain the realization of wages of all households,
the return on all assets in the economy, etc. Further, let snt denote the component of state relevant
for the optimization problem of household n, such as the history of its own wages, {W1nκ,W2nκ}
t
κ=1,
the return on all assets, and so on, and St
n contain its relevant history.
Each node st branches out into S possible states (successor nodes) in the next period. There is
ac o m p l e t es e t(S) of Arrow securities (one-period contingent claims) at every state, each paying
one unit of consumption good in exactly one state of the world tomorrow. From this description, it
is clear that all shocks are potentially insurable. Moreover, in each period a risk-free bond is also
available for investment in this economy.
The risk-free bond is traded among all households freely (that is, without incurring any ﬁxed
or proportional transaction costs) but the same does not hold for other assets. It is plausible to
t h i n kt h a ti tt a k e st i m ea n de ﬀort to initially learn how ﬁnancial markets work (a one-time cost),
and once in the market, to monitor the performance of one’s portfolio (a ﬁxed cost per-period).3
3In the empirical part, we look at the U.S. data from 1984 to 1992, when these informational costs were presumably
6Empirical evidence suggests that both of these costs are likely to be signiﬁcant in practice.4 To
capture this idea, we assume that households have to pay a one-time cost of Ψ0 to enter the stock
market, and a ﬁxed cost of ΨP
n in every period they participate thereafter.5 In principal, we can
also allow both these costs to change through time at the aggregate level. As will become clear in
the empirical part where we entertain this possibility, this modiﬁcation does not aﬀect the main
results, so we assume them to be ﬁxed through time to save on notation. Note that we have not
introduced proportional transactions costs, because this would preclude perfect risk sharing even
among stock market participants.
As for the income of households, both the husband and the spouse are endowed with one unit
of time in each period which they allocate between working in the market and leisure time spent
at home. Provided that the labor market is competitive, the wage rate of each individual in the
economy can be written as follows:
Wint = δw
³
b Znt
´
Wt, (2)
where δw(b Znt) is an eﬃciency index function; b Znt is a vector of household characteristics possibly
containing some elements not included in Znt,a n dWt is the market wage rate. Although we do not
need to make any assumptions about the labor market for tests of risk sharing, this wage equation
will be useful in some speciﬁcations as an additional moment condition to increase asymptotic
eﬃciency of the estimator.
To better understand the choices facing a typical household, it is useful to express the decision
problem recursively. Let d0
n be an indicator function which takes on the value 1 if the household
has ever participated in the stock market before and is zero otherwise. Each period households
decide whether to participate in the stock market in the current period by paying the ﬁxed cost,
ΨP
n+
¡
1 − d0
n
¢
Ψ0, o rt os t a yo u t s i d ea n dt r a d ei nt h er i s k - f r e eb o n do n l y .D e ﬁne q(s) ≡ (q1,q 2,...,q S)
to be the price vector of the Arrow securities when the state is s,a n dq0 to be the bond price.
Similarly, let kn ≡ (k1n,k 2n,...,k Sn) denote a current stockholder’s portfolio choice vector of Arrow
securities, and k0n be the bond holdings of a non-stockholder. We drop the time subscript, and
higher than what they are now. Of course, these costs fell substantially in the past few years which also boosted
participation in ﬁnancial markets. This relationship is also implied by the model described here.
4Vissing-Jorgensen (2000) estimates these costs from micro data and conclude that even modest ﬁxed costs are
suﬃcient to keep a large fraction of households out of the stock market. Luttmer (1999) and Paiella (2000) also
estimate participation costs, although they do not distinguish between the diﬀerent types.
5The one time entry cost, Ψ
0, is not essential for any of the results in the paper; it is introduced to show the
generality of the test results even under state dependence. However, allowing Ψ
0 to be individual-speciﬁcw o u l d
substantially complicate the estimation of the participation decision, so we avoid it.
7denote next period’s variables by primes. Then a household’s problem is:
υ
¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢
=m a x
dn∈{st,no}
£
υst ¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢
,υno ¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢¤
where
υst ¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢
=m a x
Cn,L1,L2,kn
©
u(Cn,L 1n,L 2n,Zn)+βEt
¡
υ
¡
ω0
n,d 00
n;S0
n,Z0
n
¢¢ª
s.t
Cn + qT (s)kn ≤ ωn +
2 P
i=1
(1 − Lin)Win(s) − ΨP
n −
¡
1 − d0
n
¢
Ψ0
ω0
n
¡
s0¢
= ks0n.1,
and,
υno ¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢
=m a x
Cn,L1,L2,k0n
©
u(Cn,L 1n,L 2n,Zn)+βEt
¡
υ
¡
ω0
n,d 00
n;S0
n,Z0
n
¢¢ª
s.t
Cn + q0 (s)k0n ≤ ωn +
2 P
i=1
(1 − Li)Win(s)
ω0
n = k0n,
where υst and υno are the value functions of current stockholders and non-stockholders respectively,
and ωn denotes ﬁnancial wealth.
Note the diﬀerence between the budget sets of current stockholders and non-stockholders. In
particular, the former group chooses an unrestricted S × 1 portfolio vector implying that they can
transfer any (budget-feasible) amount of wealth to a particular state in the next period. Thus mar-
kets are dynamically complete within the stock market community. In contrast, non-stockholders
are restricted to choosing a state-independent (constant) wealth level, k0, for the next period.
2.1 Perfect risk-sharing
The model that we laid out in the previous section features a choice in every period between
a complete markets world and an incomplete markets world and thus has a more complicated
structure than the models underlying previous tests of risk-sharing. To ﬁx ideas, let us ﬁrst look at
the canonical complete markets model, where all households can trade in a complete set of securities
in all periods. In this case, each household maximizes
E0
·
τ P
t=0
βtu(Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)
¸
8subject to a single lifetime budget constraint:
E0
"
τ X
t=0
βtλ(st)(Cnt −
2 P
i=1
(1 − Lint)Wint)
#
≤ 0, (3)
where λ(st) is the time-zero price of one unit of consumption in state st (i.e., the state-price
density). If, on the other hand, households have only access to a single risk-free bond–markets are
incomplete–then they face a sequential budget constraint:
Cnt + qtk0n,t+1 ≤ k0,t +
2 P
i=1
(1 − Lint)Wint, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
For the incomplete markets case, the ﬁrst order conditions are:
u1 (Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)=µnt, (4)
ui(Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt) ≥ µntWint,i =2 ,3,
where µnt is the Lagrange multiplier on the time t budget constraint, and ui is the partial derivative
of u with respect to its ith argument.
On the other hand, in the complete markets case, if we let φn be the multiplier associated with
the lifetime budget constraint (3), it can be easily shown that (4) holds true but with some extra
structure imposed:
1
φn
u1 (Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)=λt, (5)
1
φn
ui(Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt) ≥ λtWint,i =2 ,3. (6)
Taking the ratio of (5) for periods t and t+1to eliminate the unobservable component, φn,w e
get
u1 (Cnt+1,L 1nt+1,L 2nt+1,Znt+1)
u1 (Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)
=
λt+1
λt
. (7)
This last equation provides a clear illustration of perfect risk sharing: the marginal utility growth
of all households (on the left hand side) should only be a function of aggregate variables (the right
hand side). An alternative way to phrase this statement is that after accounting for preference
shifters and the leisure times of head and spouse, the cross-sectional distribution of consumption
growth should not be correlated with the cross-section of any household-level variable. Notice
how radical this prediction is: it requires (not ex-ante, but) ex-post marginal utility growth to be
equated across households. Any deviation from this equality that may be observed in data can
9only be attributed to measurement error or unobserved heterogeneity (through Znt). On the other
hand, with incomplete markets, shocks to marginal utilities, µnt, are individual speciﬁca n da r e
potentially diﬀerent for every agent. The main test of PRS is to estimate the relationship in (7)
and then see if any idiosyncratic variable is correlated with the resulting error term.
Turning to the model with endogenous participation presented in the previous section, there is
the additional complication that households optimally enter and exit the stock market in diﬀerent
states and thus face complete markets and incomplete markets at diﬀerent points in time. Fortu-
nately, in any given period, the same risk-sharing condition still holds for households who are in
the stock market in that period. We derive this result in Appendix A. Thus we can use (7) together
with the participation decision (selection equation) to test for risk-sharing among stockholders.
2.2 The participation decision
In general a closed form solution to the participation choice is not available, although it is easy to
see that a numerical solution can be obtained by solving backwards starting from the last period
of a household’s life (for example, as in Keane and Wolpin (1997)). The focus of this paper is on
risk-sharing, and our interest in the participation decision is mainly for having a good speciﬁcation
of households who self-select into the stock market. Thus, rather than explicitly solving for dnt,
we will seek variables that determine the participation decision, which we can obtain from the
optimization problem above.
A household enters the market if υst ¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢
> υno ¡
ωn,d 0
n;Sn,Zn
¢
and stays outside if
the reverse holds which means the decision rule will be a function of the vector of state variables:
¡
ωnt,d 0
nt,St
n,Znt
¢
. In the context of this particular portfolio choice problem, Snt contains the
household’s wage history, Wt
n = {W1nκ,W 2nκ}
t
κ=1, and asset prices. Furthermore, we assume that
asset returns are serially independent, so only the vector Wt
n enters the decision rule.6
The cost parameter ΨP
n will aﬀect participation through the budget constraint of υst. Similarly,
if d0
nt =0 , then Ψ0 enters the decision rule. Other parameters of the model will also play a role
in this decision, but they are all assumed identical across the population except those already
summarized in Znt, so they can be soaked up into the functional form. To sum up, we can write
the binary decision rule for a typical agent as
dnt =1
©
π
¡
ωnt,d 0
nt,Wt
n,Znt,ΨP
n,Ψ0¢
≥ 0
ª
,
6The independence assumption on returns, aside from being quite common in the literature, is made for the
following reason: As we discuss in the next section, to deal with selection bias, we will assume that the error terms
in the selection equation are i.i.d. This latter is a common assumption in the dynamic discrete choice literature (c.f.,
Keane and Wolpin (1997); Honoré and Kyriazidou (1999); Chintagunta, et. al. (2001)) and is a necessary assumption
for the particular estimation strategy that we will use. See Section 4. Independence of returns is a clean way to
satisfy this assumption without necessitating a measurement of returns faced by each agent.
10where 1{·} is an indicator function, and π(·) is determined by the solution to the problem.
Notice that the set of variables included in π(·) represent all potential determinants of stock-
holding; it is likely that empirically only a subset of them are signiﬁcant factors in participation
choice. For example, variables which aﬀect υst and υno symmetrically will leave υst − υno un-
changed and will have no impact on participation. Thus, identifying the signiﬁcant determinants
of stockholding is ultimately an empirical question, which we address in Section 6.1
3 Empirical Investigation
Since perfect risk-sharing imposes restrictions on marginal utilities, the speciﬁcation of preferences
is especially important for the purpose of this paper. A false rejection of PRS may very well result
from ignoring heterogeneity, non-separabilities, and so on. For example, Ogaki and Zhang (2001)
strongly reject PRS when they restrict the risk aversion parameter across the population, but ﬁnd
no evidence against it once they allow for preference heterogeneity.
We assume the following period utility function for each group
Ui(C,L1,L 2,Z) ≡ δ0(Z)Cρi
0L
ρ2
2 + δ1(Z)L
ρi
1
1 L
ρ3
2 ,
for i = st,no,a n dw h e r eρst
0 = ρno
0 + a0,a n dρst
1 = ρno
1 + a1.7
This speciﬁcation for preferences is quite ﬂexible, and is in fact, more general than most of
those considered in the previous literature. The ﬁrst sub-utility can be interpreted as a Cobb-
Douglas home-production function where (food) consumption serves as capital and female leisure
hours as labor input. One can view this speciﬁcation as the ﬁrst two sub-utilities of a more general
function in which non-food consumption enters in a separable manner. For further discussion and
justiﬁcation of this separability (which has also been the maintained assumption in all previous
papers using PSID) see Section 5.
The second sub-utility captures the possible non-separability between the leisure time by head
and spouse. Non-separable speciﬁcations in both sub-utilities have empirical support (Browning
and Meghir (1991), Altug and Miller (1990)). Another possibility is to have male leisure also enter
the ﬁrst sub-utility. Hayashi, et. al. (1996) test for this possibility and do not ﬁnd any support for
it. Moreover, if in fact male leisure and consumption are non-separable, tests based on equation
(7) are invalid due to observational equivalence.8
Some components of the vector Znt may not be observable to the econometrician. Hence, it
is convenient to write Znt =( xnt,ε1n,ε2n, ε1nt,ε2nt), where xnt is a vector which represents the
7This speciﬁcation restricts the female leisure parameters ρ2 and ρ3 to be the same across two groups. This is not
dictated by economic theory but is rather an identifying assumption. In Section 7.2, we investigate the robustness of
our results to relaxing this restriction.
8See Attanasio and Davis (1996, page 1235) for a discussion of this point.
11observable component, and the εs denote the unobservables. Each sub-utility is weighted by indices
which are log-linear functions of Znt:
δi
m(Znt)=
1
ρi
m
exp(Bmxnt + εmn + εmnt),m =0 ,1.
Here Bm is a ﬁxed vector of coeﬃcients; εmn represents the ﬁxed household-eﬀect, and εmnt
is a zero-mean disturbance term which varies both over time and across households. Further
assumptions on the error terms will be stated in the next section. Note that each subutility is
scaled by ρ0 and ρ1.
Finally we want to parameterize the participation equation. One empirical issue that arises is
that d0
nt may not be observable given the short time dimension of available panel data sets. For
example, in PSID if a household did not own stocks in 1984 when stockholding information was
collected for the ﬁrst time, then there is no way to determine the value of d0
nt. A reasonable way
to get around this problem is to assume that the knowledge acquired by paying this ﬁxed cost
depreciates quickly (in one period) if a stockholder leaves the stock market. In this case what
matters is whether a household was in the stock market in the previous period or not, and dn,t−1
replaces d0
nt in the selection equation.
For tractability, we specialize the selection function π(·) to a linear form, which allows us to
write the decision rule as a standard binary choice equation. Substituting the observable and
unobservable parts of Znt,we obtain
dnt =1 {φdn,t−1 + θϕnt + ηn − ηnt ≥ 0}, (8)
where φ is a scalar related to Ψ0; θ is a ﬁxed vector of coeﬃcients; ϕnt ≡
¡
ωnt,Wt
n,xnt
¢
; ηn ≡
ΨP
n + ε0n + ε1n, and ηnt ≡−(ε0nt + ε1nt).
4M e t h o d o l o g y
Under the null hypothesis that the model described in Section 2 is correct, the equilibrium allocation
of household n is a single realization of the random vector {Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt}w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst
order conditions with probability one.
Using the parameterization for preferences, the risk-sharing condition for stockholders (7) yields
our ﬁrst moment condition. Deﬁne ∆ν1nt ≡− ∆ε0nt, where ∆t denotes the diﬀerence operator
between t and t − 1. After taking logarithms, ﬁrst diﬀerencing, and rearranging, we obtain
−ρ2∆l2nt = −∆ln(λt)+B0∆xnt +( ρ0 + a0 − 1)∆c1nt + ∆ν1nt, (9)
where lower-case letters denote the natural logarithms of their upper-case counterparts (except for
12xnt).
Although this equation by itself is suﬃcient to test for risk-sharing, it cannot identify all the
parameters of interest. For that purpose, we add another moment condition which is valid for all
households (so that both groups’ preferences are identiﬁed). Dividing the ﬁrst equation by the
second in (4) and (5), we get the same equation for both groups:
U2 (Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)
U1 (Cnt,L 1nt,L 2nt,Znt)
= W1nt, (10)
which is the familiar intra-temporal eﬃciency condition equating the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure to the wage rate.9 This equation can be used as a basis for
estimation. Given the parametrization for preferences, again it is convenient to take logarithms,
then diﬀerence (10), and deﬁne ∆ν2nt ≡ ∆ε1nt − ∆ε0nt. (The reason for time-diﬀerencing this
equation will become clear shortly.) Then we can write
(ρ2 − ρ3)∆l2nt = −∆w1nt +( B1 − B0)∆xnt − (ρ0 − 1)∆c1nt (11)
+(ρ1 − 1)∆l1nt − a0(dnt∆c1nt)+a1(dnt∆l1nt)+∆ν2nt.
4.1 Sample selection bias
Since ∆ν1nt and ∆ν2nt have zero mean by construction, it might seem reasonable to look at (9)
and (11) as deﬁning orthogonality conditions E [∆νint]=0 ,i=1 ,2, which could then be estimated
using GMM. However, this strategy is not directly applicable in this framework due to sample
selection.
To clearly see this point, let us ﬁrst consider the PRS condition (9) for stockholders. Also,
for the sake of discussion set φ ≡ 0, so that there is no state dependence. Since under the null
hypothesis only stockholders are able to share risk perfectly, the appropriate moment condition is:
E [∆ν1nt | dntdn,t−1 =1 ]=0 . (12)
Even if we assume that the vector {ν1nt,ηnt} is serially independent conditional on the regressors
9Notice that the MRS equation holds only when the head is working in a given period, which can potentially
cause another selection problem. But, ﬁrst, there is evidence in the literature that male unemployment is largely
involuntary (see Ham (1986), and the discussion on page 55 of Pencavel (1986), for example). Second, and may be
more convincingly, Altug and Miller (1990) estimate a Tobit speciﬁcation for selection into the labor market and
ﬁnd that the error term in the selection equation has a small and insigniﬁcant correlation with the error in the MRS
equation. Moreover, we eliminate far fewer households compared to Altug and Miller since we only require the head
to work for two consecutive years to be included in the estimation (whereas they require this for all fourteen years),
so this problem should be even less serious in this case.
13in the selection equation, for (12) to hold we still need
E [ν1nt | dnt =1 ] = E [ν1nt−1 | dn,t−1 =1 ]⇒
E [ν1nt | ηnt ≤ θϕnt + ηn]=E
£
ν1nt−1 | ηnt−1 ≤ θϕnt−1 + ηn
¤
.
First, in general both sides of this equation will be non-zero, because ηnt is correlated with ν1nt:
the unobservable preference shock, ε0nt, i si n c l u d e db o t hi nηnt and in ν1nt, naturally creating a
correlation. In other words, unobservable preference shocks will aﬀect the risk-sharing condition as
well as the participation decision.
Of course, it is still possible that these conditional expectations equal each other and the dif-
ference is zero. But this is not likely to be the case either since these expectations are functions
of θϕnt, and will vary over time as this selection index changes. Thus, time diﬀerencing will not
eliminate the selection bias term which is likely to be time-varying.
A similar selection problem manifests itself in the estimation of the MRS condition (11) because
our sample selection procedure described in next section eliminates households who change their
stockholding status during the sample period: dnt 6= dn,t−1.10 Even though this moment condition
holds for the whole population unlike the PRS condition, the error term ∆ν2nt has zero mean over
the entire population, whereas we need this expectation to be zero over the sample that we observe:
E [∆ν2nt | dnt = dn,t−1]=0 . The rest of this section will detail the method that we will use to
consistently estimate this model also allowing for state dependence (φ 6=0 ) .
We employ the semiparametric ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator recently proposed by Kyriazidou (2001)
adapted to deal with endogenous regressors. She considers the case where all regressors in the
main equation are either strictly exogenous or lagged endogenous variables. On the other hand, in
our case consumption and leisure are likely to be correlated with the contemporaneous preference
shocks captured in ν1nt. Second, measurement error can also induce correlation between regressors
and error terms. As long as these measurement errors are multiplicative, taking the logarithm of
the ﬁrst order conditions will push them into the error term ν1nt, and we can still consistently
estimate the model by instrumenting for these regressors.
Let ynt be a vector of instruments. We make the following two assumptions.
Assumption A1. {(νnt,ηnt)}τ
t=1 is i.i.d over time for all n, conditional on ζn ≡ {ϕn, ηn, yn0,
dn0}, where ϕn ≡ (ϕn1,...,ϕnτ).
Assumption A2. (νnt,ηnt) is independent of yns for all s<t ,a n df o ra l ln conditional on ζn.
The ﬁrst assumption is the same as condition (A10) in Kyriazidou (2001). The second one is a
slight weakening of her assumption (A20) that allows us to have endogenous variables in the main
10Of course identiﬁcation in the selection equation comes from observations on switchers, otherwise φ would not
be identiﬁed. So, we start with a sample including switchers, after estimating the selection equation switchers are
eliminated for the main equation to be consistently estimated.
14equation and to instrument for them using lagged dependent variables.
The idea behind this estimator is in the spirit of Powell (1987) who proposed pairwise compar-
isons in the cross-section to eliminate the sample selection bias. In our context, it can be explained
as follows. For the sake of discussion, let us continue to assume φ ≡ 0. From the discussion above,
it is clear that the term E [ν1nt | ηnt ≤ θϕnt + ηn,ζn] will remain ﬁxed if and only if the selection
index, θϕnt, is constant in two consecutive periods. In this case, time diﬀerencing eliminates not
only the ﬁxed-eﬀect for that household but also the selection bias term. Thus, we replace (12) with
E [∆ν1nt | ∆θϕnt =0 ,d ntdn,t−1 =1 ,ζn]=0 . (13)
However, one immediately observes that if ϕnt contains any continuous variables, the set of house-
holds {θϕnt = θϕnt−1} may be very small, or even empty. One strategy is then to assign a weight
to each observation which is inversely proportional to the change in the index for that house-
hold, ∆θϕnt, such that asymptotically only observations with constant indices are included in the
estimation.
By following a similar argument one can show that in the presence of state dependence (φ 6=0 ),
E [∆ν1nt | ∆θϕnt + φ(1 − dn,t−2)=0 ,d ntdn,t−1 =1 ,ζn]=0 . (14)
Note that when dn,t−2 =1this conditioning set reduces to the same one above. Thus, if a
household is observed for three consecutive periods as a stockholder, the same kernel-weighted
estimator will deliver consistent estimates in the presence of state dependence. Similarly, for the
MRS equation:
E [∆ν2nt | ∆θϕnt =0 ,d nt = dn,t−1 = dn,t−2,ζn]=0 . (15)
Observe that this moment condition holds for households in both groups as long as they do not
change their stockholding statuses for three consecutive periods.
Implementation
In the ﬁrst step, the dynamic discrete choice model is consistently estimated to obtain an
estimate of θ (called b θ). Then, using this estimate of the selection index, we construct weights
which we take to be “kernel density” functions of the following form:
b ψ
N
nt =
1
hN
K
Ã
∆b θϕnt
hN
!
,
where K (·) is a scalar function which satisﬁes certain smoothness and regularity conditions,11 and
11Basically, we assume that
R
|K (x)|dx < ∞ ,
R
K (x)dx =1 , and consider symmetric kernels:
R
xK (x)dx =0 .
15hN is a sequence of “bandwidths” which tends to zero as the sample size N →∞ .F o r a ﬁxed
magnitude of diﬀerence, ∆b θϕnt, the weight b ψ
N
nt shrinks as N increases, while for ﬁxed N,al a r g e r
deviation in the index corresponds to a smaller weight.
Let f(α) denote a column vector of orthogonality conditions that is satisﬁed in the population,
f(α,n) be its sample counterpart for the nth observation, and α be the vector of identiﬁable
parameters in that system. Further, let ΦN be a stochastic matrix that converges in probability to
a ﬁnite non-stochastic limit Φ0. The estimator of α is
b αN =a r gm i n
©
GN (α)
0 Φ0
NΦNGN (α)
ª
,
where GN (α) ≡ 1
N
PN
n=1 b ψ
N
ntf(α,n) and a prime denotes the transpose of a matrix. Essentially
what we do is to stack the sample counterparts of each moment condition for observation n into
the vector f(α,n) and weight each element with the kernel weights and sum it across households to
obtain GN (α). This estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal with
√
NhN convergence
rate (Kyriazidou, 2001).12
In order to construct f(α,n), for each year t we pick (rj × 1) dimensional vectors of instruments
yjnt satisfying
E [yjnt∆νjnt|∆θϕnt =0 ,d nt = dn,t−1 = dn,t−2]=0 , (16)
for each j =1 ,...,J,where each subscript j labels a diﬀerent disturbance term. For each year then
we have
³PJ
j=1 rj
´
moment conditions for estimation denoted by ft (α,n). The indexing of rj
makes it clear that a diﬀerent set of instruments may be interacted with each error term, but the
set of instruments are ﬁxed across time. We reduce the panel data estimation into cross-section by
forming the following T∗
³PJ
j=1 rj
´
dimensional vector where T∗ is our panel length
f(α,n)=( f1 (α,n),...,fT∗ (α,n))
0 . (17)
5T h e D a t a
This section brieﬂy discusses the data for our empirical work.13 Appendix B explains our sample
selection criteria as well as variable deﬁnitions and construction in more detail.
Moreover the smoothness of the kernel aﬀects the asymptotic convergence rate which imposes restrictions on the
empirical choice of the function K (·). We will work with a Gaussian kernel which satisﬁes these conditions.
12In the absence of a formula for the optimal weighting matrix for this kernel-weighted GMM estimator, we will
choose Φ
∗
0 such that: Φ
∗T
0 Φ
∗
0 = E
³
(b ψ
N
nt)
2f(α,n)
Tf(α,n)
´−1
which is optimal in the standard GMM case.
13The sample used for estimation in this paper as well as the codes necessary to replicate all the reported results
are available at www.econ.rochester.edu/guvenen/RSH2002.htm.
16Table 1: A List of Key Variables and Their Simple Statistics
Stockholders Non-stockholders All
Hours and Earnings
(i)Average annual 2213 2177 2189
hours of husband (646.1) (686.5) (672.1)
(ii)Average annual 1451 1501 1483
hours of spouse (741.5) (706.8) (718.2)
(iii)Average hourly $17.83 $10.41 $12.99
earnings of husband (13.79) (7.45) (9.76)
(iv)Average hourly $10.10 $6.82 $7.96
earnings of spouse (9.08) (5.71) (6.88)
(v)Average annual $5249 $4419 $4708
Food consumption (2806) (2253) (2445)
Demographic Variables
(i)Average age of 43.8 39.9 41.2
husband (11.3) (11.4) (11.3)
(ii)Average Education 6.07 4.9 5.31
of Head (1.54) (1.62) (1.59)
(iii)Average household 3.3 3.6 3.5
size (1.13) (1.21) (1.18)
(i) Number of Observations 3178 5763 8941
(ii)Percentage of estimation 34.8% 65.2% 100%
sample
Note: Standard Deviations are in paranthesis. All the statistics reported are for the
ﬁnal estimation sample as described in the Data Appendix.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which has been extensively
used in the literature to study risk-sharing. We choose married or permanently cohabiting couples
as the basic unit of our economy. Although currently PSID ﬁnal release data is available from 1968
to 1993, we start our sample from 1984, which is the ﬁrst time data on stockholding was collected.
Let t stand for year (t + 1980). For each household n ∈ {1,...,N} we have data on (a) annual
leisure hours for head and spouse, denoted L1nt and L2nt for t ∈ {1,...12}, respectively; (b) real
average hourly earnings of head and spouse, denoted W1nt and W2nt for t ∈ {1,...12}, respectively;
(c) age of head and spouse, denoted A1nt and A2nt for t ∈ {1,...12}, respectively; (d) real household
food consumption expenditures (which is the sum of “food at home,” “food away from home,” and
“the cash value of food stamps”), Cnt,f o rt ∈ {1,..,6,9,...12}; (e) number of household members,
ant,f o rt ∈ {1,...12}; (f) completed education of head, Ent,f o rt ∈ {1,...12}; (g) a dummy indicating
whether the household is a stockholder, dnt, for t ∈ {4,9}. Table 1 provides the summary statistics
of the data for both stockholders and non-stockholders.
Brieﬂy, we select a family into the sample in year t if the head: (i) was in the study for four
17consecutive years including 1984 or 1989; (ii) was married to the same spouse in t and t−1;a n d( i i i )
had positive labor hours in t and t − 1. For each four-consecutive-year period, we use the ﬁrst two
years to construct instruments and the last two years for estimation. Furthermore, we follow the
standard procedure of eliminating households who had missing data on some key variables listed in
Appendix B. Filtering out these observations leaves a total of 8941 household-years (observations)
that can be used in estimation.
The deﬁnition of stockholding adopted in this paper includes ownership of shares of stock
in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, investment trusts, including stocks in IRA’s. All
households who indicate they do not own any of these assets are considered non-stockholders for
that year.14
PSID collects stock ownership data every ﬁve years (from 1984 on) whereas for our empirical
work we need this information for every year. Thus, we identify a household as a stockholder
(alternatively, non-stockholder) in every year between 1984 to 1989, if he is present in the sample
in both years as a stockholder (non-stockholder). Second, if a household switches between these
two groups from 1984 to 1989, we eliminate those observations from the sample between these
two dates since we are not able to determine when the switch exactly happens. Clearly, this
step creates another selection bias, which the econometric method is able to handle as explained
in the previous section (see equation 15). Finally, for years after 1989 we take the status of a
household as it is given in 1989. This identiﬁcation scheme is not a perfect one, but notice that
the estimation method asymptotically assigns zero weight to an observation if the probability of
being a stockholder changes (∆θϕnt 6=0 ) . Thus, a household who moves in, or who moves out of
the stock market between 1984 and 1989 will receive a small (and asymptotically zero) weight in
estimation since this move is likely to be accompanied by a change in the selection index (i.e., the
probability of participation in the stock market). Given that in the data stockholding is a rather
persistent phenomenon, this identiﬁcation should provide a reasonable approximation.
Before closing this section, there are a few points concerning the use of food data for consumption
that should be addressed. First, separability between food and non-food has been the maintained
assumption in all studies on risk-sharing using PSID data mentioned above, which makes our
results comparable (Altug and Miller (1990); Cochrane (1991); Hayashi, et. al. (1996); Hess and
Shin (2000), etc.). Second, Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) provide evidence that food and non-food
consumption are separable.15 Moreover, Ogaki and Zhang (2001, 2002) ﬁnd virtually the same
14This deﬁnition does not include indirect ownership of stocks, for example, through pension funds. First, in 1980s
indirect holding was much more modest; deﬁned contribution plans became much more popular in the last decade.
Second, we may not want to include these indirect stock owners in our sample anyway, because we want portfolio
holdings to represent optimal choices on the part of households. Pension plans are not likely to satisfy this condition
and may not be suitable for sharing risk unless one is willing to pay steep withdrawal penalties.
15See also, however, Attanasio and Browing (1995) who argue against separability between food and non-food
consumption.
18results regarding PRS when they replicate their tests using non-durable consumption insead of
food expenditures, which is reassuring. Third, a possible concern could be that food consumption
may not be suﬃciently variable causing risk-sharing tests to have low power. But, if anything, the
volatility of food consumption (from PSID) is higher than the volatility of non-durables consumption
calculated from the Consumption Expenditure Survey. This is true for both stockholders and non-
stockholders. Finally, many of the papers mentioned above are able to reject PRS for the diﬀerent
groups that they analyze which suggests that the power may not be low after all.
6 Estimation
6.1 First step: The selection equation
The ﬁrst step in the procedure is to consistently estimate the parameter θ from the participa-
tion equation in order to determine which of the potential factors are empirically signiﬁcant for
the stockholding decision. This question has received a lot of attention recently, especially with
the boom in stock market participation during the 1990s. Researchers have estimated static and
dynamic discrete choice models of participation in ﬁnancial markets. Using diﬀerent data sets
and increasingly more general approaches, each subsequent paper has, by and large, conﬁrmed the
ﬁndings of earlier ones.
Among these, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) estimate a static logit model for stockholding using
individual-level data from the Survey of Consumer Finances with eighteen explanatory variables
which can be grouped as follows:
1. Demographic variables: age, age square, sex.
2. Socio-Economic variables: marital status, race, education level (less than high school, high-
school, some college).
3. Preferences: attitude toward risk (low, intermediate), willingness to give up liquidity.
4. Income and wealth: labor income (square root), ﬁnancial net worth (cubic root), whether
majority of wealth is inherited.
5. Occupation (whether managerial occupation).
Essentially, this list contains all the variables included in our speciﬁcation of the selection
equation (8) except for lagged participation (and labor income is used instead of wages). They
ﬁnd that the following variables are signiﬁcant at 10% level: (1) race, (2) less than high school
education, (3) high school education, (4) risk aversion measures, (5) managerial occupation, (6)
labor income, and (7) ﬁnancial net worth.
19Extending this work, Hurst, Luoh, and Staﬀord (1998) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2000) analyze
the dynamics of stockholding decision in PSID data using a probit estimation. In consensus, they
ﬁnd the same variables above to be signiﬁcant determinants (at 1% or lower) of the decision to
become a stockholder. The latter paper investigates true state dependence using 1984 stockholding
status as d0
n and ﬁnds strong evidence supporting it (φ is signiﬁcant at 0.1% signiﬁcance level).
Moreover, unlike Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), these studies use the time average of recent labor
income (typically past three to ﬁve years) rather than current income for Wt
n, which is closer to
our speciﬁcation.
An important point to observe about these ﬁndings is that except for labor income and ﬁnancial
wealth (6 and 7 above), these explanatory variables represent individual (or household) character-
istics that do not change over time. Since kernel weights are constructed based on the time change
in the selection index, all but two of these regressors become redundant.16 Consequently, the coef-
ﬁcient estimates on these ﬁxed characteristics do not aﬀect the second step estimation. The only
information we need to know is which of the regressors are signiﬁcant, and those above include all
variables that are signiﬁcant at 10%, to be conservative. The conclusion we draw from this analysis
is that, in order to correct for the selectivity bias, we need to mainly consider movements in labor
income and ﬁnancial wealth through time.
The fact that these studies use labor income instead of wages is not critical. First, in our sample
total family labor wages–which we deﬁne as b wnt ≡
Pt
κ=t−2 log(W1nκ + W2nκ) analogous to Hurst
et. al (1998) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2000)–has a correlation of 0.86 with the square root of family
labor income, suggesting that it can be a good proxy for that variable. Second, average labor hours
are very similar across stockholders and non-stockholders, so income variable is on average a scaled
version of wages. Nevertheless, labor income is an endogenous variable (due to labor hours) and is
thus likely to be correlated with the preference shifters included in ∆ν1nt, which is not allowed by
Assumption A1 above. In our work then, we substitute b wnt, for labor income.17
A similar argument applies to ﬁnancial wealth which may potentially be correlated with all past
values of ν1nt. To eliminate this endogeneity, we ﬁrst observe that the average wealth level of a
household over the relatively short sample period can be captured in the ﬁxed eﬀect ηn, which is
allowed to have arbitrary correlation with ν1nt for all t. Persistent diﬀerences in wealth levels across
households are probably more signiﬁcant in determining participation than smaller year-to-year
variations over time for a given household. Second, year-to-year changes in household’s ﬁnancial
16Note that even though we have not explicitly stated in the selection equation, π (·), in Section 2.2, heterogeneity
in preference parameters is also likely to aﬀect the participation decision. The papers mentioned here all include
risk aversion measures, so they control for diﬀerences in ρ0. But again, given that preferences are ﬁxed over time for
a given household, they will not aﬀect the kernel weights.
17In fact, using alternative proxies for labor income, for example, by assigning ﬁxed weights corresponding to average
male and female labor hours of each household, or even using the labor income itself (ignoring the correlation) yields
qualitatively the same results as those reported here.
20wealth is likely to be correlated with changes in labor income. This relationship is clear when there
is a shock to labor income and agents respond by saving or dissaving. But another possibility is
that households may experience shocks directly to wealth, such as a bad entrepreneurial investment.
The wage variable in PSID also includes the labor portions of business and farm income as well as
of trade, gardening, and so on (Appendix B gives the exact deﬁnition) suggesting that some part
of these shocks will also be captured in labor income. Thus, the proxy used above for labor income
will also capture some of the short-term variation in ﬁnancial wealth during the sample period. To
sum up, the two variables, b wnt and ηn, are likely to account for a sizeable part of the variation in
the selection index that is due to variations in income and wealth.18
Note that none of the studies mentioned above ﬁnd age to be a signiﬁcant determinant of stock
market participation. Although participation does increase with age–from around 20 percent at
age 25 up to 35 percent at age 50 in our sample period–that increase is fully explained by the
life cycle evolution of labor income and wealth. Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli (2002) conﬁrm this
ﬁnding when they estimate the participation decision in 6 European countries and use age dummies
to allow for possible nonlinearities. If there was age dependence that part of the selection index
would not diﬀerence out completely and would have to be taken into account in kernel construction.
While this is feasible, the non-dependence makes implementation easier.
Finally, if there was not extensive empirical evidence on the determinants of participation
decision, or if the coeﬃcient estimates were crucial for the estimation of the main equation, then
it would be desirable to re-estimate the selection equation using less restrictive (non-parametric)
methods. One could then implement the semiparametric estimator recently proposed by Honoré
and Lewbel (2002), as long as the selection equation contains one regressor which is independent
of both the ﬁxed eﬀect and the disturbance term.
6.2 Second step: The main equation
In this section we discuss the estimation and testing of the main equation. The main equation
that we are interested in testing is the PRS condition for stockholders (9) reproduced below for
18Note that we are using the time average of wages, b wnt, not the contamporaneous value, to construct kernel
weights so that households who receive wage shocks in the current period do not necessarily receive a smaller weight.
As a speciﬁc example, an individual who works at time t − 3 , then loses his job and remains unemployed for two
years, and ﬁnds a new job at t for a comparable wage would receive a weight close to 1 even though he experienced a
large shock at time t. So, even asymptotically, there will be a positive measure of households who experience income
shocks in the current period which is important for testing for PRS. Moreover, the cross-sectional standard deviation
of ∆b wnt for stockholders and non-stockholders are very close to each other (0.36 versus 0.38) implying that on average
both groups receives similar kernel weights. Second, households face many other shocks that are not captured by
income movements such as health shocks, strikes, and involuntary moves (Cochrane 1991; Hayashi et. al 1996). We
are also testing for insurance against these other sources of shocks which are captured by including instruments for
leisure hours of head and spouse, past consumption levels, and so on.
21convenience:
−ρ2∆l2nt = −∆ln(λt)+B0∆xnt +( ρ0 + a0 − 1)∆c1nt + ∆ν1nt. (9’)
As noted earlier, the MRS equation (11) will be used to identify the remaining parameters of
the model:
(ρ2 − ρ3)∆l2nt = −∆w1nt +( B1−B0)∆xnt − (ρ0 − 1)∆c1nt +( ρ1 − 1)∆l1nt (11’)
−a0(dnt∆c1nt)+a1(dnt∆l1nt)+∆ν2nt.
Another beneﬁt of this MRS equation is that it can yield some insight into the validity of the
instruments that we use for testing full insurance. Since all the variables in the PRS equation
(except λt) also appear in the MRS condition, any measurement error in the former equation will
also show up in the latter. The same is true for the unobserved part of family characteristics.
Thus, if an instrument is correlated with ∆ν1nt, it will also be correlated with ∆ν2nt. So, when
we estimate the MRS equation alone, it will get rejected indicating a potential problem with that
instrument. We will then avoid those instruments when testing PRS.
Finally, the following “seemingly unrelated” wage equation (2) can further increase the asymp-
totic eﬃciency of the estimator through the correlation of error terms:
∆w1nt = ∆ln(Wt)+B2∆b xnt + ∆ν3nt. (18)
As for the empirical speciﬁcation of xnt, we choose a square and a cubic polynomial of husband’s
age, A2
1nt,A 3
1nt, and the household size, Hnt.19 These variables are intended to capture the changing
household structure and needs through the life-cycle (such as consumption requirements, spouse’s
time to care for children, etc.).20
There are a number of diﬀerent ways the risk-sharing hypothesis can be tested. The ﬁrst and
most obvious one is to estimate (9’) alone for stockholders and use Hansen’s J − test as a model
speciﬁcation test. If stockholders are not sharing risk perfectly, then marginal utility growth cannot
be completely explained by aggregate shocks and the resulting error term will be correlated with
idiosyncratic variables. By including household-level variables in the instrument set this correlation
will be caught by the J − test as a model speciﬁcation error. This idea also forms the basis of the
previous tests implemented in the literature.
19Similarly, b xnt includes a constructed experience variable:
¡
A1nt + E
2
nt
¢
where Ent is the categorical education
variable.
20We have also experimented with adding a linear term in husband’s age, spouse’s age, husband’s education
level, and the number of children in the household, but these additions left the hypothesis testing results essentially
unchanged.
22A second method, whose advantage will become clear in a moment, is the following: First esti-
mate the MRS condition (18) which holds for the entire population. Then append (9’) multiplied
by dnt as an additional moment condition and estimate the two jointly, and test for PRS as an overi-
dentifying restriction of the model. Speciﬁcally, if the additional orthogonality condition imposes
p1 extra restrictions and identiﬁes p2 additional parameters (and p1 >p 2)t h e nNhN (eﬀective
sample size) times the increment in the GMM criterion function is distributed χ2 with (p1 − p2)
degrees of freedom.21 This test has the ﬂavor of a Chow test, in the sense that we test a restriction
for a subsample of the population.
The second approach has the advantage of exploiting more information thereby increasing the
eﬃciency of the estimator and the power of our hypothesis test. This latter method is our preferred
test, but for completeness we will also report test results with the former one.
6.2.1 How to choose the kernel bandwidth, hN?
A standard Gaussian density is used for the kernel function K (·) which is asymptotically nearly op-
timal (Epanechnikov, 1969). Because asymptotically optimal kernel functions perform only slightly
better even in the limit, normal density is a reasonable choice in practice.
The ﬁrst step is to choose hN. As is usually the case with semiparametric methods, asymptot-
ically optimal methods for selecting the bandwidth provide little guidance for practical implemen-
tation with a ﬁxed sample size. However, observing that the estimated weighting function, b ψ
N
nt,
has a structure similar to a kernel density estimator, a sensible approach is to select hN as the
cross-validated value for the estimation of the density of the selection index, θϕnt (see, Chen and
Khan 2002 for a similar application of this idea). Hence, the bandwidth is chosen by minimizing
the mean integrated squared error of the kernel density estimator as described in Fan and Gijbels
(1996, page 150). This procedure yields h∗
N =0 .24.
Figure 1 plots the criterion function which is quite ﬂat between 0.2 to 0.5, although it increases
steeply outside this region. Due to the exponential nature of weights, small diﬀerences in the
value of hN in this range results in large variations in kernel weights. For example, a household
whose selection index changes by 50% between two periods is weighted by 0.61, 0.13 and 0.004 for
hN =0 .5, 0.24 and 0.15. To make sure that our conclusion is robust to values of hN in this range,
we will also report the results throughout for hN =0 .5 as well.
21See Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) for derivation in the standard GMM case; it is straightforward
to derive it for the estimator here using the results in Kyriazidou (1997, 2001). However, in the latter case, because
the estimator is asymptotically biased, the distribution of the test statistic is non-central chi-squared, with the non-
centrality parameter (NCP) equal to the squared mean of
¡
1/
¡√
Nhn
¢¢PN
n=1 b ψNfj(αj,n). Even though this quantity
can be estimated in principle, this is very diﬃcult in practice (see Bierens 1987 for a detailed discussion). The Monte
Carlo experiments in Kyriazidou (1997, 2001) suggest that this bias is very small in general, which implies that the
NCP is also small. We use the central chi-squared distribution to perform the hypothesis tests. In the worst case,
this will bias the results towards rejection if the NCP is large (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, pp. 412-414).
23Figure 1: Cross-Validation Objective as a Function of hN
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7R e s u l t s
In this section we report our empirical ﬁndings. First, we investigate the eﬀect of the bias correction
method introduced in Section 4.1. Second, we discuss the results obtained from tests of risk-sharing
for stockholders, non-stockholders and the whole population. Then we check the robustness of the
results: we repeat the tests of PRS using long time diﬀerences of the moment conditions (as
advocated by Attanasio and Davis (1996)), using future values of wages as instruments (as argued
by Hayashi et. al (1996)), by reducing the number of instruments (to check sensitivity to small
sample performance) and by using the moment conditions implied by the cross-sectional distribution
of leisure. We conclude by discussing parameter estimates.
In PSID consumption (food) data is not available in 1987 and 1988, which leaves us with six
time diﬀerences that can be used in estimation: 83-84, 84-85, 85-86, 89-90, 90-91, 91-92.
Instruments. Our main set includes the following nine variables for the estimation using the
time diﬀerence between t − 1 and t: a constant; age of head at time t, A1nt; age of spouse at time
t, A2nt; household size at time t and t − 1, H nt and H nt−1; change in log consumption from year
t − 3 to t − 2, ∆cn,t−2; change in log wage of husband from year t − 3 to t − 2, ∆w1n,t−2; change
in log spouse’s wage from year t − 3 to t − 2, ∆w2n,t−2; a dummy indicating whether household is
a stockholder or not, dnt.
T h i si n s t r u m e n ts e ti su s e df o rt h eM R Sc o n d i t i o n . N o t i c et h a tw eh a v en o ti n c l u d e dt h e
ﬁrst lags of variables which are susceptible to measurement error, such as consumption and wages,
because the resulting correlation with variables in the MRS equation would make them invalid. For
the PRS condition, we add the contemporaneous wage growth of the head, ∆w1n,t, as well as its ﬁrst
lag, ∆w1n,t−1, to increase the power of the risk sharing test. Since this equation does not contain
24head’s wage, possible measurement error in wages is not likely to cause a problem. Finally, in order
to keep the total number of instruments small, we exclude the stockholding dummy, dnt, and use
change in household size instead of levels (∆H nt−1). Finally, for the wage equation, (18), that will
be added later we exclude female wage change, ∆w2n,t−2, and consumption growth, ∆cn,t−2, but
add the education of head, E1nt to the instrument set above.
7.1 Tests of risk-sharing
As explained earlier, we test for risk-sharing among stockholders, and to provide a benchmark,
also among non-stockholders. In order to investigate the eﬀect of bias correction, we ﬁrst estimate
the model by a naive GMM estimator which ignores the sample selection problem. First, column
1A of Table 2, displays the results for the estimation of the MRS equation only. The χ2 statistic
for model speciﬁcation test has a value of 46.5 with 43 degrees of freedom, so the MRS condition
cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels (p − value =3 2 .9%). Next, we append the
PRS condition for stockholders (1B). The incremental value in the χ2 from this extra moment
condition is 81.1 (127.6 minus 46.5) with 41 (84 minus 43) degrees of freedom. The corresponding
p-value is 0.02% indicating a very strong rejection of perfect risk sharing among stockholders.
On the other hand, for non-stockholders the overidentifying restriction test has a p-value slightly
higher than 5% surprisingly providing much weaker evidence against perfect insurance among this
group (column 1C). However, notice that all this discussion is based on estimation results without
correcting for the potential selection eﬀect. In fact, peeking ahead to Table 8 (columns 1 and 4),
we see that the parameter estimates are erratic, raising suspicion about the reliability of estimation
with naive GMM.
Starting with stockholders, columns 2B and 3B display the results for hN =0 .5, and for the
optimal bandwidth, h∗
N =0 .24 respectively. With bias correction, the p-value barely moves to 0.07%
and is less than 0.04% at the optimal bandwidth, conﬁrming the strong rejection for risk-sharing
among stockholders. On the other hand, turning to non-stockholders (2C and 3C) something quite
unexpected happens: As the bias is eliminated the weak rejection disappears and the p-value rises
from 5.7% all the way up to 55%! When we further tighten the bandwidth (hN =0 .1) stockholders’
p-value slightly increases to 2.4% (which may partly reﬂect the smaller eﬀective sample size–
weights fall exponentially with hN–and the reduced power of the test). Again, non-stockholders’
p-value is unaﬀected (4B and 4C).
As explained earlier, it is also possible to estimate the PRS equation alone. This approach has
the following advantage: a possible measurement error in wages will appear both in the error term
of the MRS equation as well as in the explanatory variables of the selection equation violating
assumption A1. However, the model speciﬁcation test for the MRS equation (the J−test in 1A to
3A of Table 2) never rejects that moment condition indicating that this is not likely to be a serious
25Table 2: Test of Risk Sharing with Different Bandwidth Values
(1A) (1B) (1C) (2A) (2B) (2C)
Naive GMM hN =0 .5
Group S+N S N S+N S N
Moment Conditions MRS MRS & MRS & MRS MRS & MRS &
P R SP R S P R SP R S
Test Statistics
χ2 46.5 127.6 102.9 40.8 116.3 79.9
df 43 84 84 43 84 84
p-value (Model) 0.329 0.001 0.064 0.566 0.011 0.601
p-value (PRS) 0.0002 0.057 0.0007 0.551
Table 2 (continued)
(3A) (3B) (3C) (4A) (4B) (4C)
h∗
N =0 .24 hN =0 .10
Group S+N S N S+N S N
Moment Conditions MRS MRS & MRS & MRS MRS & MRS &
P R SP R S P R SP R S
Test Statistics
χ2 40.69 117.8 80.12 48.23 108.9 89.2
df 43 84 84 43 84 84
p-value (Model) 0.57 0.008 0.599 0.269 0.056 0.266
p-value (PRS) 0.0004 0.542 0.024 0.474
Notes: S and N denote stockholders and non-stockholders respectively. P-value (Model) is the signif-
icance level of the J-test for the joint estimation of all the moment conditions in a given column.
P-value (PRS) refers to the signiﬁcance level associated with the PRS moment condition df is the total
degrees of freedom for all the moment conditions in a given column. The instrument set for the
MRS equation includes a constant, age of head, age of spouse, household size and its lag, consumption
growth lagged twice, husband’s and spouse’s wage growth lagged twice, and a dummy indicating stock
ownership. Instrument set for PRS: include log wage change from t − 2 to t − 1 and from t − 1 to t,
but exclude the stockholding dummy, and use change in household size instead its levels.
26Table 3: Tests of Risk Sharing using the PRS equation only
(1a) (1b) (3a) (3b)
hN =0 .5 h∗
N =0 .24
Group SN SN
Moment Conditions PRS PRS PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 47.68 29.54 52.07 24.47
df 29 29 29 29
p-value (PRS) 0.002 0.343 0.003 0.267
For explanations see the notes after Table 2.
problem. Moreover, this correlation is not likely to explain the asymmetry in test results, because
measurement error would presumably aﬀect both groups to similar extents. Nevertheless, to rule
out measurement error completely, it is still desirable repeat the test using the PRS equation only,
where head’s wage does not appear.
Using (9’) only PRS is still rejected for stockholders with p-values less than 0.3% (Table 3). On
the other hand, for non-stockholders, the corresponding p-values are 34.3% and 26.7%, again far
away from rejection.
Another advantage of this last test is that it is not aﬀected by the identifying assumption
we made about the constancy of ρ2 and ρ3 across the two groups. Because the PRS equation is
estimated for one group at a time, that restriction is void here and the decisive rejection in this
case only serves to strengthen the results.
Robustness
These ﬁndings seem somewhat unexpected. Before discussing potential explanations for these
results, let us ﬁrst take a closer look and check the robustness of these results. First, endogeneity
of instruments is not likely to explain these ﬁndings, because in that case the MRS equation would
also be rejected when estimated alone, which was not the case. Moreover, it is not clear why invalid
instruments would aﬀect stockholders substantially while not being revealed in non-stockholders’
estimation at all. Second, could this result be due to the poor ﬁnite sample properties of the GMM
estimator?22 To investigate this possibility, we reduce the degrees of freedom by eliminating lagged
consumption change (∆cn,t−2), and head’s and spouse’s lagged wage changes (∆w1n,t−2,∆w2n,t−2)
from the instrument sets of both equations reducing the degree of freedom to 25. Test results
reported in Table 4 conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings. Alternatively, eliminating (∆w1n,t,∆w1n,t−1)
22The Monte Carlo evidence in Kyriazidou (1997, 2001) suggests that the small sample properties are quite well-
behaved especially for sample sizes around what we consider in this paper. Still, we ﬁnd it compelling to investigate
if our results are robust to the number of instruments used.
27Table 4: Further Tests of Risk Sharing Using a Small Instrument Set
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1a) (1b) (1c)
hN =0 .5 h∗
N =0 .24
Group – SN – SN
Moment Conditions MRS MRS & MRS & MRS MRS & MRS &
PRS PRS PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 31.5 82.8 52.6 34.4 80.8 57.6
df 35 60 60 35 60 60
p-value (Model) 0.636 0.029 0.731 0.497 0.038 0.564
p-value (PRS) 0.001 0.687 0.004 0.566
The instrument set for MRS equation includes a constant, age of head, age of spouse, household size
and its lag, husband’s contemporaneous wage growth and its ﬁr s tl a g . T h ei n s t r u m e n ts e tf o rP R S :
exclude stockholding dummy, and use change in household size instead of its level.
instead of lagged wage changes (not reported) has no appreciable eﬀect on these results.
There are two important points that deserve further discussion. First, as noted by Hayashi et.
al. (1996), tests of perfect risk sharing may not have high power against the alternative of self-
insurance if the instrument set only includes lagged values of variables such as income, and exclude
contemporaneous values. This is because even with incomplete markets, the permanent income hy-
pothesis implies that lagged endogenous variables will be uncorrelated with current forecast errors.
If, further, the forecast error can be written as the sum of an aggregate and an idiosyncratic compo-
nent, then lagged variables will have zero correlation with the idiosyncratic component even when
markets are incomplete. Hayashi et. al. could not use ∆w1n,t as an instrument due to measurement
error since the same variable also appears in their risk sharing equation. In contrast, our instrument
set does include contemporaneous wage growth because ∆w1n,t does not simultaneously appear in
the PRS equation (which is also true in most other papers). Nevertheless, for completeness we
follow Hayashi et. al and replace ∆w1n,t and ∆w1n,t−1 with the bracketing wage changes from t−2
to t+1and from t−3 to t+1. As Table 5 displays, PRS is still strongly rejected for stockholders,
and although the p-value is somewhat lower than before for non-stockholders (=25.7% at h∗
N)i ti s
still far away from rejection.
A second observation, originally made by Attanasio and Davis (1996), is that the tests of PRS
may have higher power if one considers marginal utility growth over longer horizons than one year.
This would be especially true if yearly changes in income are partly anticipated, or if they are
dominated by measurement error. To implement a test with long time changes, we replace the
yearly changes in the PRS equation with 6-year changes from 1985-91 and 1986-92. Also note
28Table 5: Test of Risk-Sharing Using Lead Instruments
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
hN =0 .5 h∗
N =0 .24
Group SN SN
Moment Conditions PRS PRS PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 57.7 40.3 51.8 36.7
df 32 32 32 32
p-value (PRS) 0.003 0.149 0.014 0.257
Notes: The instrument set includes a constant, age of head, age of spouse, change in household size,
husband’s log wage change from t − 3 to t +1 , and from t − 2 to t +1 .
Table 6: Test of Risk-Sharing Using Long Time Differences
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
hN =3 .0 h∗
N =1 .86
Group SN SN
Moment Conditions PRS PRS PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 28.3 9.08 26.9 10.51
df 14 14 16 16
p-value (PRS) 0.012 0.825 0.019 0.720
Notes: The instrument set includes a constant, age of head, age of spouse, change in household size,
consumption growth lagged twice, husband’s wage growth from t − 6 to t, and from t to t +1
that the optimal bandwidth has to be adjusted to account for six-year changes in wages. Table 6
displays the new results. PRS is reject at 2% signiﬁcance level or lower for stockholders whereas
there is still no evidence against risk sharing among non-stockholders.
After discussing the parameter estimates, we will present additional tests using a new moment
restriction which essentially conﬁrm the ﬁndings of this section. Overall, then we conclude that
there is signiﬁcant evidence against perfect risk-sharing among stockholders in PSID, but there is
virtually no evidence against it among non-stockholders.
Before closing this section we compare our ﬁndings to existing work reviewed in the Introduction,
which strongly rejected perfect insurance in the whole population. We repeat our main test of PRS
for the whole population. In columns 1A and 2A of Table 7, perfect insurance is rejected at
any signiﬁcance level above 2%. Adding the wage equation (18) leads to even stronger rejections
29Table 7: Tests of Risk Sharing in the Whole Population
(1a) (1b) (1a) (1b)
hN =0 .50 h∗
N =0 .24
Group S+N S+N S+N S+N
Moment Conditions MRS & PRS MRS & PRS MRS &PRS MRS & PRS
&W A G E &W A G E
Test Statistics
χ2 86.35 137.67 86.07 135.4
df 71 111 71 111
p-value (Model) 0.104 0.043 0.017 0.057
p-value (PRS) 0.0195 0.001 0.020 0.003
Notes: The instrument set is the same one as in Table 2. See the notes after Table 2 for details.
(columns 1B and 2B).23 In light of this ﬁnding, it seems that the failure of PRS in the whole
population noted in the literature is likely to be due to the failure of risk-sharing not among the
poor, but among the wealthy.
7.2 Parameter estimates
All the structural parameters of the model can be identiﬁed by jointly estimating: (1) the MRS
equation, and (2) the PRS condition for either stockholders or non-stockholders. The wage equation
(18) is added as a third moment condition to obtain more precise estimates. In Table 8, the ﬁrst
three columns report the estimates obtained using stockholders’ PRS conditions using the naive
GMM estimator (column 1), the kernel-weighted GMM with hN =0 .5 and the optimal bandwidth,
h∗
N =0 .24 (columns 2 and 3). Similarly, the last three columns report the corresponding estimates
obtained by using non-stockholders’ PRS equation.
As before, we begin by analyzing the eﬀect of bias correction. First, when the model is rejected
(ﬁrst four columns), as can be expected, many parameters have the wrong sign: for example, in
columns 2 to 4, ρ2,ρ3 À 1 implying that preferences are convex in female leisure time. Also in
these same columns, a new child is apparently not a welcome guest: the household size coeﬃcients
B3
0 and B3
1 are often negative, meaning that an increase in household size, which is mainly due
to a new child in our sample of married couples, decreases utility everything else held constant.
Also, in the ﬁrst four columns standard errors are often very large. In the rest of this section we
will focus our discussion on the last two columns where the underlying model is not rejected (i.e.,
23Note that because switchers (dnt 6= dn,t−1) have been eliminated from the sample previously, we still use the
kernel-weighted estimator.
30Table 8: Structural Parameters From the Joint Estimation of MRS, PRS and WAGE
Equations
Ui = δ0(Z)Cρi
0L
ρ2
2 + δ1(Z)L
ρi
1
1 L
ρ3
2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group Stockholders Non-stockholders
Bandwidth nGMM hN =0 .5 h∗
N =0 .24 nGMM hN =0 .5 h∗
N =0 .24
Rejected at 5%? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Curvature Parameters
ρno
0 0.69 −0.58 0.42 −0.55 −0.24 −0.18
(0.56) (4.78) (0.71) (7.23) (0.39) (0.48)
ρno
1 −12.9 −13.3 −6.07 −8.02 −5.53 −5.46
(2.98) (32.26) (3.21) (30.61) (1.15) (1.53)
ρ2 −23.88 95.25 12.61 5 6 .44 −32.9 −35.7
(16.0) (132.3) (34.8) (436.6) (32.4) (22.8)
ρ3 −57.26 1 .92 −5.78 123.1 −45.7 −50.1
(14.8) (52.2) (33.4) (539.4) (33.9) (26.2)
a0
¡
= ρst
0 − ρno
0
¢
4.21 3.69 0.95 3.71 1.65 1.84
(1.05) (10.2) (1.29) (14.6) (0.72) (1.02)
a1
¡
= ρst
1 − ρno
1
¢
−4.51 −9.8 −0.21 −7.12 −6.83 −10.1
(3.86) (29.8) (6.52) (35.3) (3.30) (4.12)
Demographic Eﬀects
B1
0 (age-squared) 1.12 −6.40 .30 3.34 −1.29 −1.92
(3.72) (13.5) (2.97) (12.49) (3.01) (3.96)
B2
0 (age-cubed) 2.49 13.21 .15 8.72 −3.48 −5.21
(1.18) (9.81) (1.15) (7.68) (1.32) (1.73)
B3
0 (family size) −0.46 2.64 −0.31 −2.60 0.93 1.39
(0.99) (9.29) (1.02) (8.88) (1.39) (0.92)
B1
1 (age-squared) 0.71 −6.76 0.17 2.92 −1.48 −2.17
(3.72) (13.2) (2.99) (12.88) (2.82) (3.76)
B2
1 (age-cubed) 2.65 −13.11 1.24 8.91 −3.41 −5.16
(3.72) (13.5) (2.98) (12.45) (2.53) (3.35)
B3
1 (family size) 1.10 4.14 0.45 −1.05 1.53 2.04
(3.66) (14.77) (3.01) (13.12) (3.01) (3.58)
Test Statistics
χ2 (Model) 170.9 158.3 159.8 145.1 128.3 122.3
df (Model) 124 124 124 124 124 124
p-value (Model) 0.003 0.021 0.016 0.069 0.371 0.536
p-value (PRS) 0.0001 0.0006 0.0004 0.047 0.462 0.429
Notes: nGMM denotes the naive GMM estimator which does not correct for selection bias (hN = ∞).
The structural parameters are exactly identiﬁed and the standard error for parameter estimates are in
paranthesis.
31non-stockholders PRS equation is imposed). In this latter case, the estimates are economically
more sensible and are estimated much more precisely. This diﬀerence also stresses the role of bias
correction in bringing the model closer to data.
The curvature of head’s leisure in non-stockholders’ utility function, ρno
1 , is quite precisely
estimated around −5 to −6 implying that utility is concave and increasing in leisure as pre-
dicted by theory (recall that the second subutility is weighted by 1/ρno
1 so that it is increasing
in leisure). Stockholders’ curvature parameter, ρno
1 +a1, is signiﬁcantly more negative: around −13
to −15. Moreover, from the reduced form coeﬃcients, the null restriction a1/(ρ3 − ρ2)=0has
a t−distribution with 1 df and its value is 4.2 strongly rejecting no heterogeneity across the two
groups.
An economically more meaningful measure can be obtained from these parameters: the elasticity
of male labor supply with respect to wages (holding the marginal utility of wealth constant) is
L1nt ((1 − L1nt)(1− ρ1))
−1 , w h i c hc a ne a s i l yb ed e r i v e df r o mt h eﬁrst order condition for labor
choice, equation (6). Given that the average time spent at work is approximately 2200 hours
per year for both groups in our sample, assuming 16 hours of discretionary time per day, we get
L1nt =0 .37. Then the implied elasticities are 0.21 and 0.10 for stockholders and non-stockholders
respectively. This value is well within the range of numbers reported in the literature (see Pencavel
(1986) for a survey). Furthermore, given that stockholders are on average better educated (Table
1), these elasticity ﬁgures also support some previous empirical evidence that better educated men
have a lower labor supply elasticity. As for the curvature parameters for female leisure, ρ2 and
ρ3, the point estimates are always negative which implies that preferences are again concave and
increasing as predicted by theory.24
The curvature coeﬃcient for consumption in non-stockholders’ utility function, ρno
0 , is estimated
quite precisely to be around zero in all columns implying logarithmic preferences in consumption.
The diﬀerence between the curvature coeﬃcients of the two groups
¡
a0 = ρst
0 − ρno
0 ≈ 1.6 to 1.8
¢
is statistically signiﬁcant. Using the reduced form coeﬃcients from column 5, the null hypothesis
a0/(ρ3 − ρ2)=0has a t−distribution with 1 df and its value is 3.3 rejecting the null at 1%
signiﬁcance level or lower.
A puzzling observation is that the point estimates of stockholders’ curvature parameter are
greater than 1.0, which, if true, implies that their preferences are convex in consumption. This
convexity has also been noted by Altug and Miller (1990) although it is not statistically signiﬁcant
either here or in that paper. However, given that perfect risk sharing is rejected among stockholders,
24One potential caveat about the preference heterogeneity revealed in ρ0 and ρ1 is that it may in fact be coming
from heterogeneity in ρ2 and ρ3 across the two groups which we assumed away. This possibility can be easily checked
by estimating the MRS condition separately on each subsample at the expense of less precise estimates due to smaller
sample sizes. This estimation yields quite similar estimates for both groups (ρ
no
0 = −0.15, ρ
st
0 = 3.2, ρ
no
1 = −6.7,
ρ
st
1 = −19.3) suggesting that the heterogeneity uncovered is genuine.
32a plausible alternative model is that stockholders’ data are eﬃcient allocations in an economy with
private information and long-term contracts. Private information is likely to arise in business
ownership/managerial roles which are concentrated among (the wealthy) stockholders. It is well-
known that in this case, instead of the perfect risk-sharing condition, an optimality condition similar
to the consumption Euler equation holds, but in the place of consumption growth, its reciprocal, ³
ct
ct+1
´
, appears (c.f., Rogerson (1985); and Ligon (1998)). Consequently, the estimated exponent
has the same magnitude as the RRA coeﬃcient but with the inverse sign, which is what we seem
to have found. Hence, this curious ﬁnding seems point to the importance of private information for
stockholders. We discuss this point further in the next section.
Nevertheless, it is still fair to argue that if stockholders’ preferences are indeed convex in con-
sumption and there are no asymmetric information problems, then their ﬁrst order condition with
respect to consumption will no longer determine optimal choices invalidating the tests of risk-
sharing for that group. Fortunately, there is another equation, namely the optimality condition for
male leisure choice (6) that can also be used to test risk-sharing. To investigate the severity of this
problem, in the next subsection we conduct further tests of PRS implied by this equation.
Finally, the estimated coeﬃcients of household characteristics also seem sensible. The structural
coeﬃcient of Hnt is positive which means that an increase in household size (which is mostly due
to a new child, since our sample contains only married couples) increases both subutilities. Also,
from the reduced form coeﬃcients in the marginal utility growth equation, a new child increases
female leisure time by 5% in the ﬁrst year, holding other variables constant. Considering that the
average female in our sample works for approximately 1500 hours a year (conditional on working),
this implies 220 hours, or equivalently, seven weeks of work hours reduction in her labor supply
over the ﬁrst year, which probably seems reasonable.25
7.3 Further tests of risk-sharing
To investigate if the possible non-concavity of utility function might have aﬀected our results, we
conduct additional tests. Perfect risk-sharing also imposes structure on the cross-section of marginal
utility of leisure growth. After taking logs, diﬀerencing and rearranging equation (6), we get
−ρ2∆l2nt = −∆w1nt − ∆ln(λt)+B0∆xnt +( ρ1 + a1 − 1)∆l1nt + ∆ν4nt (19)
where the error term, ∆ν4nt, includes the same components as ∆ν1nt. As can be seen in Table 9,
the results are very similar: risk-sharing is rejected (p−value =0 .7%) for stockholders, but not for
non-stockholders (p − value =6 4 .8%). Adding the MRS equation as before yields an even lower
25Since the sample also includes women who do not work during the estimation period, their leisure hours do not
decrease after the birth of a baby. Hence, this ﬁgure (7 weeks) is likely to be a lower bound for working women.
33Table 9: Tests of Risk Sharing using the Marginal Utility of Leisure Equation
h∗
N =0 .24
Group – Stockholders Nonstockholders
Moment Conditions MRS PRS MRS & PRS MRS &
PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 40.69 49.23 97.57 24.62 62.03
df 43 28 71 28 71
p-value (Model) 0.571 0.008 0.019 0.648 0.767
p-value (PRS) 0.007 0.001 0.648 0.815
Notes: The instrument set is the same one as in Table 2 but excludes contemporaneous wage change
since it appears in (6). See the notes after Table 2 for other details.
p-value of 0.1% for stockholders and again no rejection for non-stockholders.
The fact that the test results are pretty much unchanged supports our argument that we should
probably not read too much into the point estimates of (ρ0 + a0) which are not signiﬁcantly greater
than unity, and that the true value is probably smaller than one. Hence the ﬁrst order condition
for consumption is also very likely to be valid.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we found strong evidence against risk-sharing among wealthy stockholders, but found
virtually no evidence against it among non-stockholders. This result is robust to a number of
changes made, such as including future wages into the instrument set and testing from long time
diﬀerences of moment conditions, which are emphasized in the previous literature. Moreover, risk-
sharing in the whole population is strongly rejected in this paper consistent with existing literature.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that the failure of PRS in the whole population is likely to be due
to the failure of the wealthy to insure the additional risks they face.
These results appear surprising until one takes into account the diﬀerent risk situations faced by
each group. As noted earlier, households in the top 20 percent of the wealth distribution own more
than 90 percent of non-housing wealth–including private capital–and almost all the corporate
equity outstanding. Thus, these households are the main investors/business owners in the economy
and are thus exposed to (idiosyncratic) production risk.26
The large literature on corporate ownership structure as well as the more recent work on private
business ownership ﬁnd agency costs (moral hazard) to be empirically important sources of market
26According to the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances the fraction of business owners (with a business value above
$10,000) among non-stockholders is only 3 percent.
34incompleteness.27 T h u s ,i na ne n v i r o n m e n tw i t hp r i v a t ei nformation, active owners/managers of
business assets will be exposed to idiosyncratic (undiversiﬁed) risk for incentive reasons. This is
true not only for small entrepreneurs but also for the corporate ownership structure both of which
directly aﬀect wealthy households.28 In other words, although the wealthy have more insurance
opportunities, their incomes are signiﬁcantly harder to insure as well. The wage measure used in
this paper includes labor portion of business income and can thus capture the correlation between
consumption growth and shocks to business income.
On the other hand, the large majority of non-stockholders are simply workers whose main source
of income are wages. A number of implicit or explicit sources of insurance are already built into this
income: long-term contracts, welfare programs, minimum wage laws, and unemployment insurance
which are usually extended during downturns, are all designed to insure workers from ﬂuctuations
in business conditions. In addition, a number of informal risk sharing mechanisms (e.g., inter-vivos
transfers, charitable donations, and borrowing and lending) further eliminate the risks faced by
most households. Note that many of these insurance opportunities are not likely to be eﬀective in
insuring losses experienced by business owners. Overall these results underscore the importance of
risks faced by the wealthy as important sources of market incompleteness.
To deal with the selection problem arising from the endogenous stock market participation
choice, we implemented a powerful new semiparametric GMM estimator proposed by Kyriazidou
(2001) for the ﬁrst time. One conclusion that we draw is thats e l f - s e l e c t i o ni n t ot h es t o c km a r k e t
seriously biases the results if not corrected for. For example, without correction the parameter
estimates are erratic, and often have wrong signs. In this sense, this analysis bears witness to the
usefulness of this estimator. Also, the weak rejection of PRS for non-stockholders is overturned
when the model is estimated correcting for the bias, although PRS is rejected in all cases for
stockholders.
From a substantive viewpoint, these results suggest that stockholders and non-stockholders
seem to face diﬀerent risk situations and have tools of varying eﬀectiveness to insure against these
shocks. As a result, the importance of market incompleteness and idiosyncratic shocks are diﬀerent
for the wealthy and the average household.
27There is a large literature on the corporate ownership structure. The classic reference is Jensen and Meckling
(1976); see also Himmelberg, Hubbard, Love (2002) and the references therein. On entrepreneurial income risk, see
Bitler, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
28Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, in principle it is possible to identify the role of entrepreneurial
risk for stockholders. In particular, looking at stockholders only, one can test the PRS separately for those who own
private businesses and those who do not. If risk-sharing is rejected for the former group but not for the latter, then
this would suggest entrepreneurial risk as an important source of market incompleteness. However, entrepreneurship
introduces another selection equation which must be dealt with as well. So, we leave this question for future research.
35A Appendix: Derivation of the Risk-Sharing Condition
It is easier to derive the risk-sharing condition from the sequential formulation of the decision problem rather than
the recursive formulation stated in the text. We use the same notation here as in Section 2. For clarity, we specialize
to the case where households only derive utility from consumption; as will become clear, the derivation extends to
t h em o r eg e n e r a lu considered in the text straightforwardly.
Recall that st denotes a particular state at time t,and s
t =( s1,...,st) is the history of states up to and including
time t. As usual the choice objects for time t are zt−measurable random variables. Let π
¡
s
t¢
denote the probability of
history s
t being realized conditional on time zero information. After each history, each household makes a stock market
participation choice, d
¡
s
t¢
, choose consumption, C
¡
s
t¢
, and a portfolio choice vector, k
¡
s
t¢
if d
¡
s
t¢
=1 ,o rk0
¡
s
t¢
if d
¡
s
t¢
=0 . We can think of an agent’s choice as a two step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, assign a participation choice
for every possible history, and for this given sequence solve the optimal consumption and portfolio choice. Repeat
this for all possible sequences of participation choices. In the second step pick the combination of participation choice
sequence which yields the highest lifetime utility. The maximum exists because of ﬁnite lifetimes. Denote this optimal
decision by d
∗ ¡
s
t¢
. Given this optimal participation choice, after any history s
t0
, and for t ≥ t
0, households face the
following problem:
max
C(st),k(st),k0(st)

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Consider a current stockholder, d
∗
³
s
t0´
=1 , and without loss of generality, assume that d
∗
³
s
t0+1
´
=1 ,f o rt h e
ﬁrst s
∗ possible states in the next period, and d
∗
³
s
t0+1
´
=1for the remaining S − s
∗ states. By substituting the
budget constraints at t
0 and t
0 +1into the objective function we get:
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C(st),k(st),k0(st)
u
Ã
ω
¡
s
t¢
−
S P
j=1
kj
¡
s
t¢
!
+
s∗ X
i=1
π
³
s
t0+1
i |s
t0´
u
Ã
S P
j=1
kj
¡
s
t¢¡
1+Rj
¡
s
t+1
i
¢¢
−
S P
j=1
kj
³
s
t0+1
i
´!
+
S X
i=s∗+1
π
³
s
t0+1
i |s
t0´
u
Ã
S P
j=1
kj
¡
s
t¢¡
1+Rj
¡
s
t+1
i
¢¢
− k0
³
s
t0+1
i
´!
+
X
st:t>t0+1
π
³
s
t|s
t0+1´
u
¡
C
¡
s
t¢¢
The second term is the expected utility in the next period over states where stockholding is optimal. Similarly, the
third term is the expected utility over states where non-stockholding is optimal. Note that the only diﬀerence between
these two terms is the investment decision in the next period:
PS
j=1 kj
³
s
t0+1
i
´
versus k0
³
s
t0+1
i
´
. Finally, the last
term captures remaining lifetime utility after period t
0 +1 .
The ﬁrst order conditions for portfolio choice at time t
0 for asset j is given by diﬀerentiation with respect to
kj
¡
s
t¢
:
0=−u
0
³
C
³
s
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+
S X
i=1
π
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i |s
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, for j =1 ,...,S
Since the diﬀerent terms
³PS
j=1 kj
³
s
t0+1
i
´
versus k0
³
s
t0+1
i
´´
do not appear in the derivative of u, we combined
36the two summations and obtain the standard Euler equation for consumption allocation. Also, note that this same
equation holds regardless of the value of s
∗ or the ordering of states, so that households who may ﬁnd it optimal to
participate in diﬀerent states tomorrow will have the same equation. Rearrange to obtain:
S X
i=1
π
³
s
t0+1
i |s
t0´ u
0
³
C
³
s
t0+1
i
´´
u0 (C (st0))
¡
1+Rj
¡
s
t+1
i
¢¢
=0 , for j =1 ,...,S
Just like in the standard case with complete markets in all periods, the S equations above give a unique solution for
the S marginal utility growths in terms of aggregate variables. Thus, marginal utility growth does not depend on
individual variables, implying perfect risk-sharing:
u
0
³
C
³
s
t0+1
´´
u0 (C (st0))
=
λt+1
λt
where λ denotes this aggregate shock.
It is clear that this derivation does not depend on u being only a function of consumption. Moreover, following
the same approach, it is easy to show that a similar condition holds for marginal utility of leisure growth (given in
equation (5)).
BA p p e n d i x : T h e D a t a
We use the PSID data set on U.S. households. Starting with the “family ﬁles” from 1982 to 1993 waves, we use the
following sample selection criteria to select our main sample. Speciﬁcally, we include household-years in t and (t−1)
in estimation if the head of the family:
(i) is in the study for at least four consecutive years (t − 3,t− 2,t− 1,t) including 1984 or 1989,
(ii) is married to the same spouse at least in the last two years (t − 1,t) of the same period,
(iii) has a positive labor income at least in the last two years (t − 1,t) of the same period.
These criteria produced a sample of 2350 households who were in the study between 1984 and 1993, not necessarily
for all years. Further, we eliminated households who did not satisfy data reliability controls on some key variables as
follows:
We have eliminated a household-year if:
(iv) annual family food consumption expenditure was less than $150,
(v) head’s education variable was missing for the last two years (t − 1,t) of this period,
(vi) if head’s or spouse’s reported annual labor hours exceeded 4860 hours.
Criteria (i) and (iii) above are used in most analysis of labor or consumption data, (see Altonji, 1986) to eliminate
irregular observations.
(vii) Finally if a household changed its stockholding status from 1984 to 1989, we eliminate that observation from
estimation between these two dates..
Apart from these we encountered a few cases where head or spouse had positive annual labor hours but zero
annual labor income, or vice versa. These observations were also ﬁltered out. In PSID most variables have top coding.
We also eliminate a household-year if the upper bounds for consumption is binding.
Another important concern is coding errors. Although, it is not possible to identify all of them, there is one type
which is not very hard to detect, and which can also seriously aﬀect the tests of risk-sharing: sometimes there is an
omission or an addition of an extra digit during coding. This results in a large sudden jump or drop in the time-series
of that variable. Of course if the variable has very large variance, observed ﬂuctuations may also be genuine, and
eliminating them may reduce the power of our tests. Thus, we ﬁrst isolated observations on consumption and head’s
and spouse’s wages which violated the following bound: E (Xt) − 2 ∗ std(Xt) ≤ Xt ≤ 2 ∗ E (Xt)+2∗ std(Xt). This
is clearly a generous bound. There were a total of 46 observations which violated this bound for at least one of the
three variables. Upon closer inspection of the time-series of these variables, we eliminated 41 observations which had
small standard deviations and the outlier was very close to 10 times (or 0.1 times) the sample average.
These criteria produced the following number of observations in each year:
37Number of Observations for Moment Conditions of Time Diﬀerence: Year (t) -Y e a r(t +1 )
Moment Condition 83 − 84 84 − 85 85 − 86 89 − 90 90 − 91 91 − 92 TOTAL
# of observations 1292 1289 1302 1761 1709 1588 8941
Wages: The average hourly labor earnings (wages) of head a n ds p o u s er e p o r t e di nP S I Da n da d o p t e di nt h i s
paper are calculated from the sum of the following types of income and total annual hours:
V19127 Labor Part of Farm Income
V19128 Labor Part of Business Income
V19129 Salary Income
V19131 Bonuses, Overtime, Commissions
V19132 Income from Professional Practice or Trade
V19133 Labor Part of Market Gardening Income
V19134 Labor Part of Roomers and Boarders Income.
Stockholding:T h ed e ﬁnition of stockholding adopted in this paper includes ownership of shares of stock in publicly
held corporations, mutual funds, investment trusts, including stocks in IRA’s. This deﬁnition corresponds to PSID
variables V10912 for 1984 and V17325 for 1989. All households who indicate they do not own any of these assets are
considered non-stockholders that year.
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